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JEROME FRANK
AND THE NATURAL LAW
BRENDAN F. BROWN*
T HE DISCUSSION of any aspect of the notable career of Judge Jerome
N.Frank seems timely. His departure from this life has occasioned
appraisals of his far-reaching contributions to legal science by jurists
throughout the world. Already some of these appraisals have been
published in leading legal periodicals.'
Jerome Frank had a remarkably diversified career as lawyer, federal
administrator, professor at the Yale Law School, and finally as a mem-
ber of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 He
was a member of that court from his appointment in May, 1941, until
the time of his death. Despite the many exacting duties of a tremendously
active life, he found time to write and publish seven books,3 and
numerous articles and reviews on Jurisprudence and Government.
*A.B. (1921), LL.B. (1924), Creighton University; LL.M. (1925), J.U.B. and
J.U.L. (1926), J.U.D. (1927), Catholic University of America; D.Phil. in Law
(1932), Oxford University. Professor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
' See the eulogies of Judge Frank in 10 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1957); 2 NATURAL L.F. 1
(1957); 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (1957); 66 YALE L. J. 817 (1957).
2 See Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 1-4 (1957).
3 NOT GUILTY (1957) (with Barbara Frank), describing instances where innocent
persons were unjustly convicted.
COURTS ON TRIAL (1949), myth and reality in American justice, a criticism of
the trial system.
FACT FINDING (1946), a consideration of the problem of fact - scepticism.
FATE AND FREEDOM (1945), a philosophy for free Americans, explaining his
philosophy and theory of history.
IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942), a discussion of the problems of government.
SAVE AMERICA FIRST (1938), a defense of isolationism.
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), advocating pragmatism and emphasizing
the uncertainty in law.
A bibliography of the non-judicial writings of Judge Frank appears in 24 U. CHI.
L. REV. 706-08 (1957).
As a result of his first book, the provoc-
ative Law and the Modern Mind, which he
published in 1930 at the age of forty-one,
he came to be regarded by a considerable
number of jurists as one of the founders
of the Realist
School of Juris-
prudence. This
School emerged in
the early thirties
during the great
depression in re-
sponse to the ap-
plication of the
thinking of such
scholars as
Holmes, Freud,
BRENDAN F. BROWN James and Dewey
to the American scene. This book made
him a controversial figure in the legal world,
due in part to his intellectual exuberance
which at times carried him into excessive
and unqualified generalization. Law and
the Modern Mind touched off a deluge of
juridical attacks upon him by members of
all of the other Schools of Jurisprudence.
It is with a deep sense of personal
responsibility that I undertake to explain
and evaluate Judge Frank's views on the
natural law. I do so with the full realization
that he will not be able to answer or refute
me. If he were alive, it is certain that he
would comment on this article because he
was very particular that jurists should cor-
rectly understand his views.
I write, however, not as a complete out-
sider with regard to the life and writings of
Jerome Frank. Indeed, in some respects
there was between us an underlying con-
geniality toward law, although we belonged
to two different Schools of Jurisprudence. I
have always been impressed by his intellec-
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tual honesty and by the unusual vigor of
his mind, gifted in its endowments and
driven forward relentlessly in the search
of answers to the vital questions of the
ages by an unquenchable and insatiable in-
tellectual curiosity. Our juridical congeni-
ality was evident from the unforgettable
discussion which I had with him in New
York City, shortly after his judicial appoint-
ment. It is also manifest from the favorable
references which he made to me, as a
scholastic jurist, in his book, Fate and
Freedom,4 which was published in 1945,
and again in his work, Courts on Trial,5
which appeared in 1949. It is appropriate,
therefore, that this paper take the form of
an In Memorium, a eulogy of the part
which he played in making the doctrine of
objective natural law better understood,
after his discovery that it was a powerful
instrument for the administration of justice
in a democratic society. His response to
that doctrine was one of the dominant
elements in his thinking.
Jerome Frank Profoundly Admired St.
Thomas Aquinas and His Doctrine of
the Natural Law
At first, as in the case of Jhering, the
great sociological jurist, Judge Frank was
not aware of the immense cultural wealth
available in the writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas, the great Dominican jurist of the
thirteenth century. In Law and the Modern
Mind, his only reference to Aquinas was a
citation to Roscoe Pound, who referred to
Aquinas as the chief exponent of one of
"the twelve principal ideas of the nature
4 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 218, 295 (1945).
5 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 364 (1949).
JEROME FRANK
of law"6 as expressed by man throughout
the ages, namely, that law is "a reflection
of the divine reason governing the uni-
verse." Indeed, in that work Judge Frank
devoted a whole chapter to "Verbalism and
Scholasticism" s in which he attacked the
scholastics because they worshipped logic
and inferred existence from names. The
scholastics were the custodians of the doc-
trine of objective natural law.
In 1938, Judge Frank wrote Save Amer-
ica First, a work defending an isolationist
position, and challenging the economics of
Marxism. He later receded from isolation-
ism in view of the grim results of subse-
quent world developments. In 1942, he
published If Men Were Angels, a treatise
on government in a democracy, which he
wrote while still a member of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. But it was
not until 1945, when he published Fate
and Freedom, a philosophy for free Ameri-
cans, that he first gave the world his re-
sponse to objective natural law, while
formally attacking "fate in history and
determinism in philosophy."9
By 1945, Jerome Frank had reversed his
earlier unfavorable opinion of scholasticism
by writing as follows in Fate and Freedom:
The word "Scholasticism" is sometimes
used to indicate a patronizing attitude
towards the aridity of the subjects to which
the Scholastics devoted themselves. The
charge of aridity is not too well founded,
for many of these scholars busied them-
selves with matters of government and
6 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 290
(1930).
7 Ibid.
8 Id. ch. VII.
9 See Davies, Jerome Frank - Portrait of a Per-
sonality, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1957).
economics, often, as in the case of St.
Thomas Aquinas, in a distinguished man-
ner. Moreover, they achieved skills in the
techniques of analytic thinking for which
we modems are still much in their debt.
And, through them and otherwise, the medi-
eval Church fostered the ideal of social
solidarity and a "sense of the community"
- values which were subsequently too much
neglected. 10
The vague prejudice which he had only
fifteen years previously was now yielding
to admiration. This was a tribute to the
openness of his mind and his sincere search
for truth, wherever he might find it.
Once having discovered Aquinas, Jerome
Frank's scholarly mind led him to a com-
plete exposition of the objective natural law
doctrine. In Fate and Freedom, he wrote
that:
[Aquinas] depicted natural law as a
reflection of Divine Reason, knowable to
man through his own "natural reason."
Wise and, for his day, tolerant, St. Thomas
taught that there are but a few, and highly
general, immutable principles of natural
law. Men should do good and avoid evil,
good being what is good for man in the
light of his "natural" inclinations; thus
men should seek their self-preservation and
should live, in society, as perfectly as pos-
sible the kind of life suitable to human na-
ture. There are also, he said, a few secon-
dary principles of natural law .... 11
In Fate and Freedom, Judge Frank refers
to Aquinas as "a genius. '12 He quotes
Charles Beard, the great historian, as prais-
ing Thomas Aquinas and his followers be-
cause " 'ethical considerations occupied a
central position in their thought,' because
they took 'universal humanity as their
10 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 99 (1945).
11 Id. at 123.
121d. at 178.
ideal,' and 'offered a sublime vision of
peace with justice and mercy prevailing on
earth as in heaven.' ,1"
Jerome Frank in this same work pleads
for a new phrase to express the basic ideas
in the words "natural law."114 He was keenly
aware of the multiple erroneous contents
which writers had placed in that phrase,
which had thus become ambiguous. He be-
lieved that false content in that expression
had obscured the pragmatic character of
the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas in the
sense that part of the natural law is dynamic
and is developed by experience, trial and
error, and a measure of utility.1
By 1949, when the important work,
Courts on Trial, appeared, Judge Frank
bestowed still more commendation on St.
Thomas Aquinas and his concept of the
natural law. In that book, aimed at a pene-
trating appraisal of the jury system, he
wrote that:
Some Natural Law adherents have main-
tained that from the Natural Law princi-
ples men can logically deduce a detailed
code of legal rules valid forever and every-
where.
That last notion is rejected in the Roman
Catholic conception of Natural Law. That
conception merits high respect from non-
Catholics. Formulated in the 13th century
by St. Thomas Aquinas, it is often called
the Scholastit or Thomistic version of
Natural Law.16
He goes on to state that, "The enlightened
Catholic will not expect uniformity in
judicial formulations of the legal rules even
by judges who believe in Natural Law and
13 Id. at 219, citing BEARD, THE OPEN DOOR AT
HOME ch. 1 (1934).
14 Id. at 294.
15 Id. at 294-95.
1 6
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 362-63 (1949).
5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959
earnestly attempt to apply it.' 17 It may be
mentioned that Judge Jerome Frank was
evidently using the word "Catholic" in
this context in a rough sense to describe
the fact that the Thomistic version of the
natural law is more consonant with the
Catholic idea of supernatural law than any
other type of legal philosophy in so far as
both the natural law and the supernatural
law are objective expressions of the Per-
sonal Divine Lawgiver of the Universe. The
former is communicated to man indirectly
through his reason and the latter directly
through revelation. But acceptance of the
supernatural law, which is dependent on
grace, is not a condition precedent for the
adoption of the doctrine of objective nat-
ural law, which was perceived in its rudi-
mentary form by such pre-Christian pagans
as Aristotle.
The Thomistic Concept of Rule and
Fact Uncertainty Resembled in Many
Ways the Frankian Thesis of Law and
Fact Scepticism
The doctrine of law and fact scepticism
was the core of Jerome Frank's jurispru-
dence. It resembled in many respects Thom-
istic conclusions with regard to the appli-
cation of the positive law in the judicial
process.18 Aquinas was a sceptic in the
sense that his writings reflected the spirit of
constructive doubt and open inquiry, a con-
17 Id. at 364.
18 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, IL-IL, qq. 67-71
(Amer. Ed., Fathers of English Dominican Prov-
ince Transl. 1947). In these questions, St. Thomas
was concerned with sins committed against justice
on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant, the
witness, the lawyer and the judge.
JEROME FRANK
stant search for truth, and the considering
of problems from many points of view. The
distinctive literary format of his Summa
Theologica, namely, a presentation of the
arguments or objections against his posi-
tion, followed by a general reply, and then
a detailed answer point by point with
reference to the objections, emphasizes his
critical approach.
Aquinas taught that part of the natural
law was immutable but that another por-
tion was dynamic and changing. The con-
tent of this second part was made by the
application of the few immutable princi-
ples to ever changing social, political, cul-
tural and psychological facts.19 Since these
facts may not always have been accurately
ascertained, and the factual conclusions
therefrom correctly drawn, there may be
room for constructive doubt, leading at
times to a suspension of judgment among
moralists as to whether a particular syllo-
gistically-derived remote conclusion is actu-
ally true.20 Thus it may have been doubt-
ful at one time whether the loaning of
money at interest had ceased to be against
the natural law. This is so not because of
any defect in the five senses of man, or in
his rational faculty, but rather because he
is finite, and hence in some cases incapable
of obtaining a definite answer to every
problem. Error and consequent uncertainty
to some extent .always lurk in the fact-find-
ing process and in determining the rele-
vance of the facts themselves.
According to Thomas Aquinas, the posi-
tive law should implement the immutable
principles as well as the mutable sub-prin-
19 Id. 1-I, q. 94, art. 5.
20 Ibid.
ciples of the natural law. 21 Positive law in
turn is then applied to the facts of litigation,
used in the judicial or administrative proc-
esses. 22 Just as some incertitude may exist
in the changeable sub-principles of the nat-
ural law and in the resulting positive law,
so also uncertainty is enhanced when posi-
tive law is applied to the facts in a law
suit.2 3 These are the specific facts which
affect the rights of the parties in their peti-
tions for justice from politically organized
society. The uncertainty as to whether jus-
tice has been adequately administered by
a decision for A against B may be greater
than the incertitude as to whether the posi-
tive law has implemented justly the natural
law.
Aquinas went so far as to discuss the role
of the witness, the matter of his credibility,
and the problems of uncertainty created by
contradictions on the part of a witness.2 4
He distinguished between contradictions as
to what a witness had seen or heard, and
those of opinion and report. The former
would impeach his evidence, but not the
latter. He concluded that discrepancies as
to irrelevant or minor details should enhance
the credibility of the witness, because if
his story is too "pat," there is a presump-
tion that the witness was coached. 25
Now all this sounds similar to Judge
Frank's doctrine of law and fact scepticism,
first formulated in Law and the Modern
Mind26 and fully elaborated in Courts on
21 Id. I-I, qq. 95, 96, 97.
22 1d. II-Il, q. 70, art. 2.
23 Ibid.
2 4 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85,
264-84 (1930).
Trial. His two chief juridical preoccupa-
tions were always with legal and factual
uncertainty as they affected the administra-
tion of justice. But as time passed, he be-
came more and more of a fact-sceptic and
less and less of a law-sceptic. This may
have been due in part to his work as an
appellate court judge. His continuing
judicial duties probably caused him to take
a more authoritarian attitude toward law,
and to admit that legal rules and principles
had more meaningfulness and reality than
he was able to concede when he wrote
Law and the Modern Mind from the point
of view of the legal practitioner. 27 But it is
also significant that this shift in emphasis
from rule-scepticism to fact-scepticism, a
phrase which he apparently coined, was in
line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas.
As he became less sceptical about the law
and more doubtful about the ability of
the judge to know the facts, he approached
the position of Aquinas.
Jerome Frank Discovered and Praised
the Thomistic Concept of Rule and
Fact Uncertainty
Judge Frank eventually found in the
works of Aquinas, written about seven
hundred years previously, a recognition of
the psychological, biological, realistic and
subjective aspects of the administration of
justice. 28 These were the aspects emphasized
in Law and the Modern Mind, 1930, but
at that time, apparently, he was without
benefit of the learning and wisdom of
27 See Derham, Judge Jerome Frank: An Austral-
ian Note of Appreciation, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
643, 646 (1957).
28 See Sharp, Realism and Natural Law, 24 U.
CHI. L. REV. 648, 652 (1957).
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Aquinas. In the forties, he was aware of
the Thomistic concept of natural law, par-
ticularly in reference to the notion of rule
and fact uncertainty.
In Fate and Freedom, 1945, Judge Frank
approves the rule-uncertainty of Aquinas
in these words:
The applications of these principles [i.e.,
of the natural law] to meet particular human
problems, wrote St. Thomas, must vary with
time, place, and circumstances.
Aquinas's humaneness and sagacity made
his conception of natural law exceedingly
flexible and relatively undogmatic - attri-
butes neglected by some of his disciples.
Thanks in considerable measure to his
writings, most subsequent social theoriz-
ing was cast in the form of "natural law."'29
Again in Courts on Trial, 1949, Jerome
Frank quoted Aquinas with further ap-
proval as a law-sceptic, as follows:
The practical reason is concerned with
practical matters, which are singular and
contingent. . . , wherefore human laws
cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to
demonstrated conclusions of science ...
Consequently, although there is necessity
in the general principles, the more we de-
scend to matters of detail, the more fre-
quently we encounter defects.30
Judge Frank also discovered that
Aquinas had discussed at length the prob-
lems of the trial judge, and actually antici-
pated Frankian fact-scepticism. With re-
gard to the fact-facet of the judicial process,
Frank, in Courts on Trial, refers to Aquinas
as follows:
To be sure, he [Aquinas] did say "A
judge's sentence is like a particular law re-
garding some particular fact," and he did
briefly discuss the task of the trial judge
29 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 124 (1945).
30 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 366 (1949).
JEROME FRANK
when dealing with conflicting testimony. In
some situations, he said when the witnesses
disagree, the judge must use his "prudent
discernment," his "discretion. 3 1
Jerome Frank also cited in full Question
70, Article 2, of Part I of the Summa
Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. There
Aquinas discussed the problems of proof,
evidence, and the credibility of witnesses,
which a trial judge faced in endeavoring to
reconstruct prior events. Frank then con-
cludes by writing: "Aquinas here, unlike
Cardozo, clearly recognized 'fact discre-
tion.' ",32 Judge Frank was of the opinion
that Cardozo's legal experiences were too
restricted to the activities of an appellate
court lawyer and judge to enable him to
arrive at a sufficient understanding of "fact-
discretion. '33
The Area of Dissimilarity Between
Aquinas and Frank Should Be Viewed
in the Light of the Fact That the Latter
Was Not a Formally Trained
Philosopher
In some respects, there was a funda-
mental difference between the jurisprudence
of Aquinas and that of Frank. Aquinas,
unlike Frank, was not sceptical as to the
existence of the few principles of the nat-
ural law which he regarded as unchange-
able. He had no doubts as to the accuracy
of man's five senses, apart from such acci-
dental outside factors as would, for ex-
ample, result in an optical illusion. He
did not doubt the capacity of man's reason
to know truth, i.e., conformity of the idea
31 Ibid., citing AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
I-II, q. 67, art. 1, q. 70, art. 2.
32 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 366-67 n. 26 (1949).
3Id. at 57-58.
in the mind with the fact, physical or meta-
physical, outside the mind.
Aquinas, unlike Frank, was pragmatic
only in regard to that area of human be-
havior which did not fall within the inhi-
bitions of the ethically controlling moral
norms. According to Aquinas, in this re-
stricted area, experience or so-called prac-
tical results cannot override divine au-
thority, knowable and known by natural
reason.
3 4
Aquinas, like Frank, acknowledged the
sphere of the subjective and the intersub-
jective, i.e., the common denominator of
a number of subjectively made principles
or ideals, which in turn is used as a quasi-
objective criterion for at least limited
purposes. But Aquinas, unlike Frank, went
beyond the intersubjective and accepted the
truly objective, which was something more
than the product of the human mind.
It may be noted that Judge Frank made
a supreme effort to discover an area be-
tween the intersubjective and the abso-
lutely objective. The possibility of ever
finding such an intermediate zone was one
of the principal subjects of our discussion
when I visited Judge Frank in the early
forties. I expressed my own scepticism as to
his power ever to find a substitute for ac-
ceptance of the eternally objective. It seems
eternally untrue to assert the existence of
the absolutely relative or the relatively ab-
solute.
Jerome Frank was not satisfied with an
intersubjective objectivity, but he was not
ready to embrace an immutable and objec-
tive moral order. He was retreating from
the merely subjective or intersubjective be-
34 AQUINAS, SUMMA T.HEOLQGICA I-II, q. 94, art.
cause ideals had taken on a new meaning
for him with the advent of World War II.
He saw men giving their lives for ideals
such as justice and freedom, which they
evidently regarded as more important than
life itself - the greatest physical good for
man, upon which all other corporeal good
depends. Hence, he reasoned that such
ideals must be beyond the subjective, and
also the intersubjective, which is merely an
extension of the subjective.
In Fate and Freedom, Judge Frank
sought to refute the existence of objective
truth by an appeal to the authority of cer-
tain physical scientists.35 These authorities
endeavor to shake the truth of such prop-
ositions as the whole is greater than any of
its parts. But it would appear that no
authority was cited to prove that a physical
thing may be and not be at the same time,
in the same way, and in the same place.
Indeed, the opposite is a truth relating to
physical matter, self-evident and indemon-
strable, as Aristotle and Aquinas have
explained. By way of analogy, the duty to
do moral good and avoid moral evil is also
an immutable objective truth.
But since Jerome Frank was not a pro-
fessional philosopher, as he has more than
once pointed out in his books, perhaps the
strictly metaphysical implications of his
conclusions may be minimized. In ultimate
analysis, he was a jurist and lawyer who
desired to use law for the betterment of
society. The technically professional impli-
cations of his scepticism and pragmatism
* appeared for the most part proximately
irrelevant for this limited, practical purpose.
If this be so, then it is possible for a scho-
lastic jurist in evaluating the Jurisprudence
35 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 316-18 (1945).
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of Jerome Frank to draw the line between
true and false pragmatism, and true and
false scepticism, and to commend that part
of his scepticism and pragmatism which
was true instead of attacking them in their
totality. Frank himself used an analogous
technique when he distinguished between
wise and unwise Greek sceptics.3 6
Though Judge Frank Did Not Fully
Accept the Thomistic Concept of Nat-
ural Law, Nevertheless It Exerted a
Significant Influence on His Thinking
In Courts on Trial, Judge Frank appar-
ently gave the express reason why he did
not cross the line which separated the
objective from the merely subjective. He
assigned as the reason his sense of falli-
bility and finite human limitation. These
prevented him from wholly accepting the
full scope of the Thomistic doctrine of
natural law. He -expressed this thought in
Courts on Trial by writing:
Some non-Catholics balk at calling the
Catholic Natural Law principles and pre-
cepts "eternal" or divine in origin. Indeed,
to such persons.- mindful of man's finite-
ness, his limited capacity for comprehend-
ing, intellectually or emotionally, all that
goes on in the vast stretches of the universe
beyond his ken - it seems presumptuous
to assert that man should know what' is
eternal, or what constitutes order or regu-
larity, present or future, except within his
own small span of experience. 37
But in Fate and Freedom, he adopted
the principle of the immutable in these
words: "The only absolute knowledge on
which we can count is the knowledge that
human knowledge will never be absolute,
36 Id. at 332.
37 FRANK, COURTS ON TRuIAL 364 (1949).
JEROME FRANK
will always be relative and limited. '3
Judge Frank is correct when he con-
cludes that even Aquinas was unable to
find the formula of absolute truth in the
judicial process. He accurately evaluated
the limitations of Aquinas when he stated:
But Aquinas did not explain how the
exercise of this discretion was to be made
"objective": A particular trial judge who
happens to be sitting in a particular case
employs his discretion so that he decides
for the defendant. Suppose another judge
had happened to sit and had heard the
same witnesses. What means exist for guar-
anteeing even approximate uniformity (ob-
jectivity) in such matters? Aquinas does
not answer that question.3 9
Of course he did not, although Aquinas
would surely have found some merit in
Frank's proposed solution of the problem,
namely, the voluntary submission of every
judge to a psychoanalyst for the purpose of
revealing to himself and the whole legal pro-
fession his subconscious prejudices, dis-
tinctive thought processes, and peculiar
mental strengths and weaknesses. 40 But just
because the finiteness of Aquinas' mind pre-
vented him from "objectivizing" the work
of a judge, it does not follow that "Natural
Law, in the great majority of lawsuits,
encounters insurmountable subjectivity." 4 1
Nor does it follow that because Aquinas'
finite reason could not objectivize the legal
process, it was incapable of perceiving the
principles of the immutable part of the
natural law.
It may be that Judge Frank did not
3
8 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 337 (1945).
39 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 366-67 (1949).
40 Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned
Hand, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 666, 678 (1957).
41 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 367 (1949).
adopt the total concept of Thomistic natu-
ral law because of his great aversion to
dogma. But dogma in some sense is inescap-
able. The human mind must rely on some
fixed and unqualified principle or starting
point, for example, in the case of Judge
Frank, that all is mutable or, if not, cannot
be surely known to be immutable. This
absolute starting point necessarily becomes
dogma. Hence the issue is not between
dogma and no-dogma, but between good
or reasonable dogma and bad or unreason-
able dogma.
Is it not more reasonable to conclude
that finite human reason and will must have
come from a Cause which has infinite
intellect and will, since an effect may not
proceed from a cause which does not
include as much as, if not more than, the
effect, and because the finite has no sig-
nificance if there is no infinite? Judge Frank
feared dogmatism, and yet Felix Frank-
furter in a eulogy to him in the Summer,
1957, issue of the University of Chicago
Law Review wrote: "While he somehow
managed to envelop himself in an atmos-
phere of dogmatism, he was singularly free
of bias or imprisoning doctrine. '42 In view
of this estimate, therefore, was Jerome
Frank's fear of being known as a dogmatist
an adequate justification, if such were the
case (of course I do not know), for his
not becoming a scholastic jurist?
Again, it may be that Jerome Frank did
not fully sense the significance of the his-
torical fact that, in the culture of the West-
em World, the fundamental and immutable
part of the objective natural law is unknow-
ingly accepted as a postulate. It is a residue
42 Frankfurter, Jerome N. Frank. 24 U. CHI. L.
REV. 625 (1957).
from the days when the Thomistic doctrine
was a dominant influence in. thought and
action. 'It is because of this postulate and
conformity thereto for the most part that
scholastic jurists, judges and lawyers do not
find it necessary to refer constantly to the
divine origin of the natural law, and its
changeless area. But this does not mean
that in practice it is unimportant whether
some ethical principles are immutable.
It is vital that rationally perceived divine
authority be consciously admitted as the
basis of the Frankian ideals, even on a
strictly pragmatic basis. If these ideals
were ever seriously challenged in this coun-
try, and it would be naive to assert that
this could not happen, then the relativity
of all intersubjectiveness would be swept
aside. The effective choice would then be
narrowed to the moral ideals of an immu-
table natural law, or to those which are
SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE
(Continued)
profession, radiate the influence of Christ.
Everything in the temporal order such as
wealth, genius, scientific achievement and
so forth is only of secondary importance in
relation to Christ; progress is wasted if it
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diametrically opposed, but asserted by
Marxists as objective and immutable. It
seems that there is no sufficient, final author-
ity behind the ethical controls of non-scho-
lastic jurists, however true their ideals may
be, and that there is no truth behind the
characteristic values of Communists, though
they, like scholastics, believe in absolutes.
In closing this eulogy of Judge Jerome
N. Frank, may I say that he left an edifying
example of a mind sincerely and genuinely
sympathetic with objective natural law. His
favorable estimate of it came only after he
had comprehensively compared it with the
juridical ideas of the mightiest intellects
of the past. He found that Thomistic natu-
ral law afforded a very satisfying solution
of many of the absorbing problems which
were created by lack of certainty in law and
particularly in the finding of facts.
does not bring men nearer to Him, Who is
the model of our manhood. Men are not
just united by a common bond of nature
but in the brotherhood of Christ. It is their
personal relationship to Him that deter-
mines their relationship to one another and
imparts a new life and spirit to law.
